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The McDermott Tax Lien Case: And the First Shall Be Last
William H. Baker*

In 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided an unusual case, United
States v. Bruce J. McDermott,' which could affect the willingness of business
people and creditors to contract and negotiate transactions with businesses with
unimpressive balance sheets but good growth potential. McDermott involved the
priority of a federal tax lien in relation to the claim of a state judgment creditor.
The Supreme Court held, in a six-to-three decision, that even though the state
court judgment was docketed prior to the filing of the tax lien, the federal tax
lien should be given priority as to property acquired by the debtor after both
liens were filed.2
The significant facts of McDermott are as follows. On July 6, 1987, the
Zions First National Bank, N.A., docketed a state court judgment against Mr. and
Mrs. McDermott in the clerk's office of Salt Lake County, Utah. On December
9, 1986, the United States assessed income tax liability against the McDermotts
for the years 1977 through 1981. A lien for outstanding federal income taxes
was filed by the Government on September 9, 1987, in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office.'
The McDermotts acquired an interest in real property in Salt Lake County on
September 23, 1987. To permit the sale of the property and to enable the lien
claimants to satisfy their claims expeditiously, the parties agreed that the real
property would be sold and the priorities of the lien claimants would be determined
with respect to the cash proceeds of the sale as of the date that the McDermotts
originally acquired the property-September 23, 1987. The McDermotts then
brought an interpleader action, seeking a judicial determination as to which of the
adverse claimants had a superior claim to the proceeds.'
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that even though the
judgment obtained by the Zions First National Bank was docketed prior to the filing
of the federal tax lien, the federal tax lien must be given priority as to any afteracquired property received by the debtor after the tax lien was filed.6 The Court
explained that the judgment creditor did not have a perfected lien until the debtor
acquired an interest in property to which the judgment lien could attach. Although
the federal tax lien did not become perfected until the same time, it, nevertheless,
was entitled to priority under the language of Section 6323(a) of the Internal
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Revenue Code.7 That section provides that a tax lien shall not be valid as against
any judgment lien creditor (or any purchaser, holder of a security interest, or

mechanic's lienor) until notice of the tax lien has been properly filed.'
The Court also stated that it based its holding on Section 6323(c) of the Code,

which (under limited circumstances) grants priority, even as against a filed federal
tax lien to security interests arising out of certain agreements. These agreements
include written commercial transactions or financing agreements that are entered
into before the federal tax lien is filed under which the taxpayer-debtor acquires
commercial financing security (qualified property) before the forty-sixth day after
the date on which the tax lien is filed. Section 6323(c) applies not only to afteracquiredproperly,but also to loans secured by commercial financing security and
to purchases of commercial financing security (other than inventory) made before
the forty-sixth day after the tax lien filing. 9 The Court reasoned that in the absence

7. Id. at 1530.
8. Section 6323(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
(a) Purchasers, holders of security interests, mechanic's lienors, and judgment lien
creditors.-The lien imposed by § 6321 shall not be valid as against any purchaser, holder
of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor until notice thereof
which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been riled by the Secretary.
26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
9. Section 6323(c) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
(c) Protection for certain commercial transactions financing agreements, etc.(1) In general.-To the extent provided in this subsection, even though notice of a lien
imposed by § 6321 has been filed, such lien shall not be valid with respect to a security
interest which came into existence after tax lien filing but which(A) is in qualified property covered by the terms of awritten agreement entered into
before tax lien filing and constituting(i) a commercial transactions financing agreement,
(ii) a real property construction or improvement financing agreement, or
(iii) an obligatory disbursement agreement, and
(B) is protected under local law against ajudgment lien arising, as of the time of
tax lien filing, out of an unsecured obligation.
(2) Commercial transactions financing agreement.-For purposes of this subsection(A) Definition.-The term "commercial transactions financing agreement" means
an agreement (entered into by a person in the course of his trade or business)(i) to make loans to the taxpayer to be secured by commercial financing
security acquired by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of his trade or business,
or

(ii) to purchase commercial financing security (other than inventory) acquired
by the taxpayer in'
the ordinary course of his trade or business;
but such an agreement shall be treated as coming within the term only to the extent
that such loan or purchase is made before the 46th day after the date of tax lien filing
or (if earlier) before the lender or purchaser had actual notice or knowledge of such
tax lien filing.
(B) Limitation on qualified property.-The term "qualified property", when used
with respect to a commercial transactions financing agreement, includes only
commercial financing security acquired by the taxpayer before the 46th day after the
date of tax lien filing.
26 U.S.C. § 6323(c)(l)-(2)(B) (1988).
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of legislation giving priority to certain security interests, the federal tax lien would

automatically receive priority. Ordinarily, for "first-in-time" priority purposes, the
tax lien is effective from the date of filing, "regardless of when it attaches to the
subject property.""0
The judgment creditor argued that the first lien of record has priority over
later filed liens unless a statute creating a particular lien clearly establishes that
the statutory lien should be given priority. The Court stated that such a rule
might be satisfactory in resolving priority conflicts between competing private
lienholders whose liens ordinarily arise out of voluntary transactions." In such
cases, a potential creditor has the opportunity to inquire about any existing claims
against the property of the potential debtor and can decide whether to extend
credit on that basis. The Government, on the other hand, cannot decline to hold
a taxpayer liable for taxes and, therefore, is not in the same position as a private
the "first to record" presumption is
lender. The Court concluded, therefore, that
2
not appropriate under the tax lien statute.'
I. THE

FEDERAL TAX LIEN STATUTE

Under Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code, if a person owes a tax
and fails to pay it after demand, a lien for the amount owed, together with any
interest and penalties imposed by law, arises in favor of the United States on all
property and rights to property, real and personal, of the taxpayer. 3 The lien
attaches from the date on which the tax assessment is made and continues in
effect until the liability is paid or becomes unenforceable. 4 The lien is
enforceable against the property of the taxpayer at any time, but must be
properly filed to prevail against the claims of purchasers, holders of security
interests, mechanic's lienors and judgment lien creditors.' s Under Section
6323(b), even the. filing of the lien will not grant the Government priority as to

10. 113 S.Ct. at 1530.
11. Id. at 1530-31.
12. li at 1530.
13. Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the
amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty.

together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the

United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging
to such person.
26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1988).
14. Section 6322 of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
Unless another date isspecifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by § 6321 shall arise
at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so
assessed (or a judgment against the taxpayer arising out of such liability) issatisfied or
becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.
26 U.S.C. § 6322 (1988).
15. See supra note 8.
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subsequent (superpriority) creditors who are specifically designated in the
6
statute.

The tax lien statute has evolved over a long number of years. The statute
was first enacted in 1866.' 7 At that time, even though the lien was not filed,
it was given priority over bonafide purchasers for value." Through the years,
changes in the statute have been made to.protect various claimants from unfiled
tax liens, 9 In 1913, purchasers, mortgagees and judgment creditors received
such protection."
In 1939, Congress -added pledgees to the list of those
creditors protected against unfiled or improperly filed federal tax liens.2 ' Under
the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the "1966 Act" or
"the Act"), 22 holders of security interests were given priority over unfiled
federal tax liens. The Act recognized mortgagees and pledgees as those having
protected security interests. 23 Under a previous version of Section 6323(a), the
term "judgment creditor" had been interpreted as requiring that a judgment
creditor have a choate lien to prime an unfiled tax lien. The 1966 Act codified
this interpretation by referring to such a creditor as a "judgment lien creditor." 24

In addition, the 1966 Act redefined the term "purchaser" 25 and included
mechanic's lienors within the protected class of creditors.

6

16. Section 6323(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
Protection for certain interests even though notice filed.-Even though notice of a lien
imposed by § 6321 has been filed, such lien shall not be valid(1) Securities;...
(2) Motor vehicles....
(3) Personal property purchased at retail....
(4) Personal property purchased in casual sale ....
(5) Personal property subject to possessory lien ....
(6) Real property tax and special assessment liens....
(7) Residential property subject to a mechanic's lien for certain repairs and improvements....
(8) Attorneys' liens....
(9) Certain insurance contracts....
(10) Passbook loans....
26 U.S.C. § 6323(b) (1988).
17. Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. 107. See also Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 469.
18. United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 13 S. Ct. 846 (1893).
19. See William T. Plumb, Jr., Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77
Yale L.J. 228, 230-31 (1967).
20. Act of March 4, 1913, Pub. L. No. 451, 37 Stat. 1016.
21. Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 155. 53 Stat. 882.
22. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125.
23. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 § 101(a), codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (1988).
24. Id.
25. See Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 § 101(a). Section 101(a) amended § 6323(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code and added § 6323(h)(6) to the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a),
(h)(6) (1988).
26. See Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 § 101(a). Section 101(a) added § 6323(h)(2) to the Internal
Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(h)(2) (1988).
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The 1966 Act also created a new priority for certain classes of security
interests. 2 As previously indicated, the McDermott court based its holding, in
part, on the conclusion that Section 6323(c)(1) would not have been necessary
if the creditors referred to in the statute had been able to secure priority over
federal tax liens with respect to after-acquired property.2t Under Section
6323(c) of the Code, after-acquired security property acquired by the debtor more
than forty-five days after the date of tax lien filing will not be treated as
"qualified property" and will not, therefore, entitle the creditor to priority over
a filed tax lien.29
A federal tax lien does attach to the after-acquired property of a taxpayer."
The question presented in McDermott, however, focuses on how priority should
be determined when a judgment creditor is first to docket his judgment, the
United States subsequently files its tax lien, and later still, the debtor acquires the
property in question.

II. THE PERFECTION OF LIENS
The nature of a property interest is a 32question of state law.3' Federal law,
however, determines questions of priority.
In United States v. City of New Britain,3 the Supreme Court indicated that,
in the absence of legislation to the contrary, the priority of statutory liens is to
be determined by the common-law principle, "the first in time is the first in
right."' The Court stated, "[w]e think that Congress had this cardinal rule in
mind when it enacted § 3670 [now Section 6321], a schedule of priority not
being set forth therein. Thus, the priority of each statutory lien contested here
must depend on the time it attached to the property in question and became
choate." 35
A perfected lien attaches to the property in question and thereby becomes
choate. In New Britain, the Supreme Court indicated "liens may also be perfected

27. Section 101(a) of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 added § 6323(c) to the Internal Revenue

Code. 26 U.S.C. §6323(c) (1988). See supra note 9.
28. See United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526. 1530 (1993).

See also 26 U.S.C. §

6323(c)(1) and (c)(2)(A) (1988). supra note 9.

29. See supra note 9.
30. See Glass City Bank v. U.S.. 326 U.S. 265. 66 S.Ct. l08 (1945) (holding that a debt owed
to the taxpayer, which came into existence after the federal tax lien became effective, was subject
to the tax lien because the lien attaches to property owned by the taxpayer at any time during the life
of the lien).
31. U.S. v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522. 80 S. Ct. 1282 (1960).
32. U.S. v. Waddill. Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353. 65 S.Ct. 304 (1945): U.S. v. Pioneer
Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 83 S.Ct. 1651 (1963); Aquilino v. U.S., 363 U.S. 509. 80 S.Ct. 1277
(1960).
33. 347 U.S. 81, 74 S. Ct. 367 (1954).
34. Id. at 85, 74 S. Ct. at 370 (citing Rankin v. Scott, 12 Wheat. 177, 179 (1827)).

35. Id. at 86, 74 S.Ct. at 370 (emphasis added).
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in the sense that there isnothing more to be done to have achoate lien-when the
identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are
established."36 Although the Government took the position in U.S. v. Vermont
that for a state lien to be choate, it must attach to specifically identified property
and cannot attach to "all of the taxpayer's property, 38 the Supreme Court ruled
that general
liens may be treated as perfected, just like liens attaching to specific
9
3

property.

Relying on New Britain, the McDermott Court concluded that the judgment

lien of the bank was not perfected until the debtor acquired an interest in the real
estate in question. New Britain held that one of the three tests for perfection of a
lien is that the property subject to the lien must be established.,° This test was not

satisfied until the debtor acquired an interest in the property after the federal tax
lien had been filed. The judgment creditor took the position that its lien attached
to all of the taxpayer's real property, then owned or thereafter acquired, from the
moment the judgment was docketed on July 6, 1987. This argument was based on
a Utah statute,4 t the view that the judgment creditor had done everything possible
to perfect its lien, and the contention that nothing further was required to complete
its claim as against after-acquired property. JusticeThomas, dissenting, agreed that
New Britain supported the judgment creditor's position. 2 In New Britain,
however, the Court defined aperfected and choate lien as one in which the identity
of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien can be
identified. The McDermott Court's determination that thejudgment creditor could
not have a perfected a choate lien until the after-acquired property came into
existence reflects the principles established by the New Britain case. 3

36. Id. at 84, 74 S. Ct. at 369. It is noted that the Treasury Regulations, 26 CFR § 301.6323(h)I(g), use this same language in describing when ajudgment lien will be treated as perfected.

37. 377 U.S. 351, 84 S. Ct. 1267 (1964).
38. Id. at 355, 84 S. Ct. at 1269.

39. Id. at 357-58, 84 S. Ct. at 1271.
40. United States v. McDermott, 113 S. Ct. 1526, 1528-30 (1993).
41. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1953) which provided that when ajudgment is docketed, it
becomes a lien on all real property of the debtor and on all real property thereafter acquired in the
county where the judgment is docketed.
42. 113 S. Ct. at 1533 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The dissent took the position that the bank's
judgment lien was perfected when it was docketed because nothing further remained to be done by
the bank. Since the docketing of the lien occurred prior to the filing of the federal tax lien, the
judgment lien would be granted priority. The dissent argued that if specific attachment of the state
lien in Vennont was not required for the lien to be considered sufficiently choate, then the specific
acquisition (of property by the debtor) is not required in order for the judgment creditor to have a
perfected lien. It is difficult to see, however, how a lien can become perfected on property that is
not yet in existence or in which the debtor has no interest. As the majority opinion points out, it is
one thing to say acreditor has acquired a perfected lien on property of adebtor by virtue ofa general
lien which does not specifically identify the particular property; it is another thing to say that a
perfected lien can attach to property at a time when the debtor has no interest in it. 113 S.Ct. at
1529 n.3.
43. 347 U.S. 81, 84, 74 S.Ct. 367, 369 (1954).
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Neither the judgment creditor's lien nor the federal tax lien was perfected until
the debtor acquired property to which the liens could attach. Accordingly, when
the debtor acquired an interest in the real property in question, both liens became
perfected at the same instant. Once the Court determined that both liens were
perfected at the same instant, the question then became how priority should be
determined in the case of simultaneous attachment.

III. DETERMINING PRIORITIES
By holding that the federal tax lien was not perfected until the taxpayer
acquired an interest in the property in question but that the priority question should
be decided with reference to the date the federal tax lien was filed, the Court, in
effect, used a relation-back doctrine to give the Government priority. The Court
relied on the language of Section 6323(a) as supporting the proposition that "the
filing of notice renders the federal tax lien extant for 'first in time' priority purposes
regardless ofwhether it has yet attached to identifiable property."" This position
is inconsistent with the Court's holding that the federal tax lien was not perfected
until the taxpayer acquired an interest in the after-acquired property. It also is
inconsistent with New Britain4 in which the Court stated "the priority of each
statutory lien contested here must depend on the time it attached to the property in
question and became choate."46
If Section 6323(a) granted priority to the tax lien, then why was it necessary
for the Court to find that the tax lien was not perfected until the property came into
existence? As indicated above, New Britain held that the priority of liens depends
on the time they attach to the property and become choate. In addition, the relationback doctrine was repudiated in U.S. v. Security Trust & Savings Bank,47 in
connection with a claim by a creditor who initially instituted an attachment
proceeding and subsequently secured a judgment against the debtor.
The Court's reliance on the language of Section 6323(a), which gives the
Government priority in a case where the competing liens attached to the afteracquired property at the same instant, is unconvincing. If the date of perfection is
meaningless for the purpose of determining priorities, then the judgment creditor
should prevail on the language of Section 6323(a) alone, since under the "first-intime" concept, it docketed its judgment before the Government filed its tax lien. 4

44. 113 S.Ct. at 1530 (emphasis added).

45. 347 U.S. 81, 74 S.CI. 367 (1954).
46. Id. at 86, 74 S. Ct. at 370 (emphasis added).

47. 340 U.S. 47, 71 S.Ct. III(1950),
48. The Court's position on this point, see supra note 11, which differentiates the Government
from other creditors on the theory that the Government cannot decline to hold a taxpayer liable for
taxes, whereas ordinary creditors can decide whether or not to advance funds to a debtor after the
creditor knows of a prior lien, is difficult to follow. The priority of federal tax liens as against other
claims ordinarily is determined with reference to the timeliness of the claims and not with reference
to alternative options which may or may not be available to the creditors. See supra note 14 for a
discussion of the perfection of liens.
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Under New Britain, however, the date of perfection is the key date for priority
purposes.
In McDennott, both liens attached at the same time. Section 6323 says
nothing at all about priority when there is simultaneous attachment. 49 In
addition, it does not appear that Congress contemplated after-acquired property
at the time the statute was enacted.. The committee report of the United States
°
House of Representatives, relating to the 1913 amendment of the statute,s
provided that "the lien is so comprehensive that it covers all the property and
rights to property of the delinquent."'" In addition, the current version of
Section 6323(a) refers to the validity of the federal tax lien as against the four
types of claimants set forth in the section5 2 and provides, "[tihe lien imposed
by § 6321 applies to 'all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to such person."' Together, the House Report and the statute
refer only to property in which a taxpayer has an interest. No reference
whatsoever is made to after-acquired property.
Accordingly, the Court's reliance on Section 6323(a) in granting priority to
the federal tax lien in an after-acquired property case such as this is not
supported by the language of the statute5 3 and is inconsistent with New Britain.
IV. SECTION 6323(c)(1)
The Court relied on Section 6323(c)(1) as support for its holding in
McDernot. Section 6323(c)(1) grants special priority to certain types of state
security interests, even as against recorded federal tax liens. The Court reasoned
that such special protection would be unnecessary if the federal tax lien were not
otherwise afforded priority under the Code.
Section 6323(c) of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted as part of the
1966 Federal Tax Lien Act. The Senate Finance Committee Report accompanying this section stated in part,
Under present law, a filed tax lien has priority over the rights of the
lender or purchaser if the funds are not advanced, or the security
purchased, until after the tax lien filing. In addition, it has priority

49. See Southern Rock. Inc. v. B & B Auto Supply, 711 F.2d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 1983), where
the Court stated, "[w]e are left with a simultaneous filing and must decide who wins when the race
to the recording office ends in a tie. The statute does not say." After referring to the wording of the
statute, the Court continued, "The section does not indicate whether the tax lien prevails if it is filed
.at the same time as the 'holder of a security interest' comes into existence." Id.
50. Act of March 4, 1913. Pub. L. No. 451, 37 Stat. 1016.
51. H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1911-1912).
52. See supra note 8.

53. The dissenting opinion in McDennott states that the word "filed" used in § 6323(a) "provides
no textual basis for concluding that a tie goes to the Government, and simply declaring that it does,

does not make it so." See United States v; McDermott, 113 S.Ct. 1526, 1534 n.4 (1993) (citations
omitted).
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under present law if the initial assets are replaced with assets acquired
after the tax lien filing. As a result, under present law for a lender or
purchaser to be sure that no tax lien has recently been filed, he must
search the records each time before making an additional advance or
purchase. The provision added by the bill is designed to keep this
obligation within practical bounds by giving the interests arising under
the agreements providing for these loans or purchases priority over a
filed tax lien if the loans or purchases are made not later than 45 days
after the tax lien filing
and before the lender or purchaser has actual
4
notice of the filing.5
It appears that Section 6323(c)(1) primarily was designed to alleviate a problem
being faced by commercial lenders and purchasers of commercial financing
security who consummate transactions with the debtor pursuant to a written
agreement entered into prior to the filing of the tax lien but without knowledge
that the tax lien has been filed. The primary thrust of that provision is to permit
these loans and purchases to be made within a particular time frame so that the
lenders and purchasers do not have to search the records to make certain that a
tax lien has not been filed recently.
But in McDennott, all action that could be taken by the judgment creditor
was taken prior to the recording of the federal tax lien. There was no ongoing
commercial relationship between debtor and creditor. The opinion of the Court
cited no cases to support its proposition that without enactment of Section
6323(c), the federal tax lien would be given priority over judgment creditors with
respect to after-acquired property."5 The Senate Finance Committee Report also
does not refer to a need to enact Section 6323(c) in order to alleviate a problem
existing as to judgment creditors who have pursued their claims to finality prior
to the filing of a federal tax lien.6

54. S. Rep. No. 1708. 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966).
55. The Court stated that the federal tax lien was entitled to priority regardless of whether it had
attached to any identifiable property. The Court reasoned:
[t]hat
result is also indicated by the provision two subsections later, which accords
priority, even against filed federal tax liens, to security interests arising out of certain
agreements, including "commercial transactions financing agreement[s," entered into
before filing of the tax lien. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(c)(1).... According special priority to
certain state security interests in these circumstances obviously presumes that otherwise
the federal tax lien would prevail ....
See 113 S.Ct. at 1530.
56. Under present law, a filed tax lien has priority over the rights of the lender or purchaser
if the funds are not advanced, or the security purchased, until after the tax lien filing. In
addition, it has priority under present law if the initial assets are replaced with assets
acquired after the tax lien filing.
S.Rep. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966): see also Michael D. McCullough, Note, When First
in Time Is Not First in Right: The Supreme Court Frustrates Judgment Creditors in United States

v. McDermott, 25 Lay. U. Chi. L.J. 405 (1994). See also infra note 65.
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V. CASES SUPPORTING PRIORITY FOR TAX LIENS AS TO AFTER-ACQUIRED
PJZOPERTY

Cases both before and after the 1966 Act have given federal tax liens
priority over other liens with respect to property acquired by the debtor after the
tax lien was filed. 7
Some of these decisions, however, do not appear to be based on convincing
authority. A case often cited as authority is United States v. Graham. 58 In
Graham, a federal tax lien was filed before the taxpayer leased property to the
State of California. Although it is clear the state assessed taxes against the
taxpayer after the federal tax lien was filed, it is uncertain whether the State tax
lien existed prior to, or after, the accrual of rent due from the state. When the
United States sought to foreclose its lien on the rental payments due the
taxpayer, the state contended that no property of the taxpayer existed against
which the federal tax lien could be foreclosed and, even if such property did
exist, the State's right of set-off primed the federal tax lien.
The court ruled in favor of the United States, holding that the right to rental
income was a property interest subject to foreclosure, that the federal taxes were
assessed long before the leases were executed and any rent became due, and that
"the rights of the taxpayer under the lease were born with the tax lien impressed
thereon." 59 The federal tax lien, however, could not attach to property not yet
in existence, i.e. rental payments which would become due under a lease which
had not yet been executed. The federal tax lien could only attach to rental
payments due under an existing lease. Apparently, the court applied the "first-intime" rule with no regard to when the property was acquired by the debtor. The
court stated, "[ilf the state had a right of set-off against the taxpayer prior to the
United States' asserted lien and priority, the Collector would be bound to
recognize the right of the state to set-off."'
Believing that the lien of the
United States was first in time, the court granted priority to the federal tax lien.
In dicta, the court indicated that even assuming that there had been
simultaneous attachment of the tax liens and the right of set-off, "[n]o citation
of authority is needed to establish that the federal tax lien is superior to any
6
simultaneously attaching interest of the State of California." '

57. The pre-1966 law was referred to in Shawnee State Bank v. United States, 735 F.2d 308 (8th
Cir. 1984). Cases which considered this priority question include United States v. Graham, 96 F.
Supp. 318 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd mem., 195 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.). cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831 (1952);
Stockholders Pub. Co. v. Smith, 56-1 U.S. Tax Cas. par. 9420 (S.D. Calif. 1956); Randall v. Colby,
190 F. Supp. 319, 341 (N.D. Iowa 1961); In re Nap J. Hudon & Son. Inc. 65-2 U.S.T.C. 9517 (D.
Mass. 1964); Dean Constr. Co. v. Simonetta Concrete Constr. Co., 37 F.R.D. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
See also Plumb, supra note 19.
58. 96 F. Supp. 318.
59. Id. at 321.

60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis added). It would have been helpful if the Court had apprised us of the authority
on which it was relying.
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Subsequent cases cited Graham as a, persuasive authority on the question of
simultaneous attachment of liens to after-acquired property. For example, Bank

of Nevada v. United States62 involved a situation where a federal tax lien
attached to a taxpayer's bank account at a time when a competing creditor, a
bank, had only an inchoate claim against the taxpayer. The court rejected the
bank's set-off claim, 63citing Graham and stating simply, "We adhere to the
-teaching in Graham."
In In re Nap J. Hudon & Son, Inc.,6 the contest was between the federal

tax lien and a bank-assignee of accounts receivable from the taxpayer-debtor.
The taxpayer was owed money on two contracts with Quincy Shipbuilding &
Repair Co. Before the federal taxes were assessed and liens arose, the identity
of the lienholder and the amount of the lien were known, but the property subject
to the lien was not sufficiently specific and definite until the taxpayer submitted
invoices to Quincy for work done under the contracts. When the property came
into existence, the creditor's lien and the federal tax lien attached simultaneously.
Despite the fact that the assignee's lien attached to the account receivable when

the account came into existence, the court awarded priority to the federal tax lien
because it was filed prior to the date the account came into existence. The court,
however, never discussed the question of simultaneous attachment.
In footnote seven of McDermott, the Court stated that Section 6323(a) does
not distinguish between security interests and judgment creditors, and because
Section 6323(c) assumes "that all perfected security interests are defeated by the

federal tax lien," the same assumption should apply to judgment liens. 65

62. 251 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1957).
63. Id.at 825.
64. 65-2 U.S.T.C. 9517 (D. Mass. 1964).
65. Although it is true that Section 6323(a) of the Internal Revenue Code refers to a purchaser,
holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor or judgment lien creditor in an equal way, there still
is asignificant difference between what is required in the case of each in order to achieve full-fledged
status under that section. For example, a judgment creditor ordinarily has a lien on real property
once he has docketed his judgment properly under state law. McAllen State Bank v. Saenz, 561 F.
Supp. 636 (S.D. Texas 1982). In New York, as in many states, state law requires judgmeit creditors
to execute on their judgment in order to acquire a lien against personal property. See Dean Constr.
Co. v. Simonetta Concrete Constr. Corp., 37 F.R.D. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Where the funds of a
debtor are in the hands of a third person, a judgment creditor would have to issue a third party
subpoena and restraining order in supplementary proceedings to acquire a lien. Id. See also
Safemasters Co. v. D'Annunzio & Circosta, 94-2 T.C. 50,410 (D. Md. 1994), where a creditor was
held not to have a perfected lien until a writ of garnishment was served on a third party who was
holding funds belonging to the debtor. A purchaser, a holder of a security,interest and a mechanic's
lienor will have to take different steps, appropriate to their status, to achieve complete recognition
(choateness) under Section 6323(a).
The primary purpose of Section 6323(c) was to protect certain creditors and purchasers who
advanced funds to businesses. See supra note 54. Section 6323(c) does not relate to the question
of priority with respect to judgment lien creditors. It is related, however, to the fact pattern in
McDer ott because it refers to the priority that is to be given to certain types of creditors under
limited circumstances with respect to the after-acquired property of the debtor. See also supra part
IV.
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Accordingly, the Court disagreed with the dissent's view that the common law
rule of parity should be adopted and that the judgment creditor should be given
an equal interest in the property (if the creditor is not given outright priority on
the theory that its lien, in fact, was perfected prior to the federal tax lien).
Other cases involving an assignee's claim and a federal tax lien have taken
the position that in the case of simultaneous attachment of liens, the federal tax
lien wins. These cases have cited Graham and its progeny as authority for this
proposition.,
The idea of allowing the concept of parity to control where a creditor's
claim lacked "choateness" was rejected in Texas Oil & Gas Corporation v.
United States.6' This opinion presented a detailed history of the competition
6
between federal, tax liens and the liens acquired by creditors under state law. 1
VI. CASES DENYING PRIORITY TO FEDERAL TAX LIENS AS TO AFTER-

ACQUIRED

PROPERTY

Recent cases involving the simultaneous attachment issue have treated nonfederal liens more favorably. Like McDermott, McAllen State Bank v. Saenz6
involved competing federal tax liens and judgment liens which predated the
acquisition of property by the debtor. Citing Graham v. United States as
authority, the United States contended that the competing liens had attached to
the after-acquired property simultaneously and that the federal tax lien should,
therefore, be granted priority. The court criticized Graham,stating that it did not
stand for the proposition that federal liens prime other simultaneously attaching
liens. In Graham, the court explained that the federal tax lien was in effect long
before the state's right of set-off existed. The federal tax lien was thus given
priority. To demonstrate that Graham relied on the first-in-time doctrine, the
court referred to the language used by the court therein: "If the state had a right
of set-off against the taxpayer prior to the United States' asserted lien and
priority, the Collector would be bound to recognize the right of the state to set70
off.,,
The court in McAllen State Bank applied a first-in-time, first-in-right rule,
based on the filing date of the liens in question, stating "Ithere appears to be no
legal or policy reason that would mandate a deviation from the first in time, first

66. See MDC Leasing Corp. v. New York Properly Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 450 F. Supp. 179
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), arfd withoutpublished opinion, 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Meyer. 346 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); VJ. Processors. Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 679 F.
Supp. 399 (D. Vt. 1987). See also Gaeta v. United States, 82-2 U.S.T.C. 9525 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
67. 466 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1972).
68. See also Rice Inv. Co. v. United States, 625 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1980); Gaeta, 82-2 U.S.T.C.
at 9525.
69. 561 F. Supp. 636 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
70. Id. at 639.
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in right rule. The rule encourages diligent filing of liens whether or not afteracquired property is involved.",71
In 1983, in Southern Rock, Inc. v. B & B Auto Supply,"2 a federal tax lien
and a perfected security interest became effective on the same day. The court
observed that Section 6323(a) says nothing about which party wins in a
simultaneous attachment case. Acknowledging that MDC Leasing," which
cited Graham as authority, had granted priority to the federal tax lien in a
simultaneous filing case, the court stated that the MDC decision was based on
a pre-Federal Tax Lien Act interpretation of the Code. MDC Leasing's language
indicated reliance on the doctrine that to be entitled to priority or to fall within
one of the exceptions set forth in the Code, a competing lien had to be choate
prior to attachment of the federal tax lien. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966
was designed to conform the tax lien provisions to the Uniform Commercial
Code and to provide some limited relief from the harshness of the choateness
rule. In the court's view, Section 6323 had supplanted the choateness doctrine:
In our view, another aspect of choateness that no longer floats, although
concededly not specifically addressed by § 6323, is the notion that a tie
goes to the government. To the extent that the purpose of the Federal
Tax Lien Act was to conform tax liens to Article 9 security interests,
the way to achieve this goal is to treat the government like any other
creditor. Giving the government's filed tax lien priority over a
simultaneously recorded security interest would defeat this goal. We do
not believe that is what Congress intended.74
The court, therefore, held that the two liens should share the fund in question in
proportion to their claims."3
VII. CONCLUSION
The problem presented by McDermott cannot be resolved easily. The
majority opinion noted the lack of clarity in the statute when it concluded:
"Thus, while we would hardly proclaim the statutory meaning we have discerned
76
in this opinion to be 'clear,' it is evident enough for the purpose at hand.
The dissent also acknowledged the confusion present in the law on this point by

71. Id. at 639. 640.
72. 711 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1983).
73. Id. at 689.
74. Id. at 689.
75. See also United States v. Fleming, 474 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), which held that the
competing liens should share the fund on a pro rata basis. Inthat case, the court reasoned that since
the City of New Britain case applied the common law ntle of "first in time is the first in right" to
property owned by the debtor at the time the competing liens arose, in the case of after-acquired
property, it isappropriate to apply the common law rule which provides for pro rata distribution.
76. United States v. McDermott. 113 S.Ct. 1526, 1531 (1993).
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stating, "our precedents do not provide the clearest answer to the question of
after-acquired property."" In McDermott, it is clear that both liens were
perfected and attached to the real property at the same instant-when the
taxpayer acquired an interest in the property. The question then arises as to how
priority should be determined in a simultaneous attachment case. Section
6323(a) says nothing about after-acquired property and does not purport to
provide for priority in a "tie" situation. Section 6323(c) does not relate to
judgment lien creditors but was intended to protect certain security interests
against filed federal tax liens in limited situations.
Some cases have given priority to the federal tax lien in simultaneous
attachment cases. Other recent cases have held that the competing lien should
either be given priority or that both should share the fund on a proportionate
basis.
Because McDermott involved after-acquired property, it represents an
unusual example of a simultaneous attachment case. In a case where two liens
attach at the same time to property owned by the debtor, the position of the nonfederal lien might not seem as strong as in a case like McDermott, where the
judgment creditor pursued its claim to finality before the federal tax lien was
filed and would have been granted complete priority if the taxpayer had owned
the property at the time the liens attached. The only reason that simultaneous
attachment resulted in McDermott was because of the presence of after-acquired
property, a factor which had nothing to do with the diligence of the claimants.
Under McDermott, even if the judgment creditor's judgment had been
docketed many years before the Government assessed the debtor's tax liability
and filed its tax lien, the federal tax lien would still be awarded priority as to the
after-acquired property. Congress did not have such a result in mind when it
enacted Sections 6321-6323 of the Internal Revenue Code. The goal of Congress
was to reward the claimant who first pursued his claim to finality. 8 New
Britain, which announced "the first in time is the first in right" rule, followed
this interpretation of the statute. The language used by the Court in New Britain,
however, does not suggest that the Court intended to establish one rule for cases
in which the debtor owned property when the liens attached and another rule for
cases in which the debtor acquired property after the liens attached. Rather, the
Court was emphasizing those actions a claimant must take to perfect his claim.
One such action, according to the Court, was that the property subject to the lien
be identified. Only then may the lien be considered choate and perfected. In an
after-acquired property case, however, this requirement cannot be satisfied until
the taxpayer acquires an interest in the property.
The dissent concluded that the judgment creditor secured a perfected lien
when the judgment was docketed. This conclusion does not, however, satisfy the
requirements of the New Britain case. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the

77. Id. at 1534.
78. See McAllen State Bank v. Saenz. 561 F. Stipp. 636, 640 (S.D. Tx. 1982).
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judgment creditor could be awarded priority on that theory under the law as it
now stands. The dissent's position that the claimants should share the fund
available, based on the common law rule' of parity, is, nevertheless, a logical and
fair way of disposing of a case of this kind under existing statutory law and New
Britain. Such a conclusion 79is also supported by the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Southern Rock, Inc. v. U.S.
Given the uncertainty of the law, Congress should consider amending the
statute to reward diligent action by claimants in pursuing their claims to finality,
regardless of whether after-acquired property is involved. This change would
provide an element of certainty and confidence to creditors who extend credit to
debtors. Such creditors could then rely on the fact that, even if the debtor's
assets may not provide adequate protection to cover a contemplated transaction,
a judgment secured by the creditor would place the creditor in a good position
with respect to any assets subsequently acquired by the debtor. Later filed
federal tax liens would not affect any recovery which the creditor would
otherwise be in a position to receive. Congress should also consider a provision
for a pro rata sharing of a fund in those cases where the federal tax lien and the
lien of an adverse claimant are established at the same time withrespect to
existing property of the debtor.

79. 711 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1983).

